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THE ERIE RULE AND LONG-ARM STATUTES
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ERIE RULE
In the beginning there was the Rules of Decision Act' which said:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials of common
law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
This Act of Congress was construed by the federal courts to mean that
in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction the statutes of the
several states would control a decision, where there was no counter-
vailing federal statute. However, when a state did not have a statute
directly on point, the federal courts were not bound to follow what
might otherwise be valid state law. Swift v. Tyson 2 branded this con-
struction of the Rules of Decision Act on the jurisprudence of the fed-
eral courts in 1842; the federal courts thus embarked upon the perilous
course of determining federal common law, which might or might not
coincide with the common law (decisional law) of the courts of the
state in which the federal court- sat.
The justification for the development of the federal common law
system was largely the authority of Congress to create a federal court
system. The rationale upon which the doctrine was built had logical
merit but practical fallacies. Federal common law, it was reasoned,
would encourage uniformity in common law among the several states.
This in turn would lead to a more just system of law in the overall pic-
ture. Consequently, when a federal judge in a diversity case deemed
unsound or unjust the relevant common law of the state in which his
court sat, he simply adopted something sounder and wiser. This ap-
proach, it was hoped, would point out to the state court the error in
its policy, and the state would, in the interest of uniformity (and better
law?) follow the federal lead.
Unfortunately, judges being also human beings, the state courts
most often did not take the federal "hint" and tenaciously insisted upon
interpreting their law in their way. For the out-of-state litigant, who
qualified for diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts of such a state,
this duality of jurisprudence had decided advantages. A non-resident
plaintiff could make his choice of courts in the first instance. A non-
resident defendant (which was less common prior to long-arm statutes)
128 U.S.C. § 725, Act. of Sept. 24, 1789. This language was substantially un-
changed until 1948 when it was changed to read: The laws of the several
states, except where the constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be recorded as rules of deci-
sions in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply. June 25, 1948. c. 646, 62 Stat. 944. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
2 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
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could at least have the benefit of the federal court, where the jurispru-
dence was not bound by the same policy considrations as the state court.
Ease of removal of the action after it was commenced further facilitated
the forum-shopping.
The demise of such glaring disparities of law and blatant forum-
shopping came about in a most unusual manner. A Pennsylvania citizen
was injured in Pennsylvania while walking along a much-used path on
a railroad right-of-way. The Pennsylvania citizen sued the New York
railroad corporation in the federal court in New York. The railroad
contended that Pennsylvania common law, which limited the duty owed
to unauthorized persons using such a path, should be applied. The
court applied what it deemed to be the federal common law on the sub-
ject, and the plaintiff recovered. The United States Supreme Court
granted certorari and proceeded to immortalize the case of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins.3
The Court in the Erie decision made it very clear that it wished to
remove the area of "general law," or federal common law, from federal
jurisprudence in order to facilitate equal protection of the law and to
discourage forum-shopping. The Court is emphatic in its denunciation
of the Swift v. TysonO doctrine.
Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had re-
vealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected
to flow from the rule did not accrue. Persistence of state court
in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory
line of demarcation between the province of general law and that
of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.
. . . Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-
citizens against citizens .... 5
Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of
the laws.6
(This final conclusion, it should be noted, was not even mentioned in
the arguments of counsel published with the text of the opinion.)
In place of the now discredited federal common law, the Court de-
clares that the law of the State shall henceforth control.
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case in the law of
the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is
not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general com-
mon law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their
nature or "general," be they commercial law or part of the law of
3304 U.S. 64 (1938).
416 Pet. 1 (1842).
5304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).6 Id. at 75.
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torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such
a power upon the federal courts.
7
The immortality now accorded this decision is largely due to the language
above employed. As the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reed 8 points
out, the Court went beyond what was necessary to decide the case. In
addition to overruling Swift v. Tyson, and declaring that state decisional
law is binding on a federal court, the Court suggests that it is uncon-
stitutional for Congress to prescribe substantive rules of decisions. This
is an issue which was neither briefed nor argued. Mr. Justice Reed
suggests that the language of the Court removes the authority of Con-
gress to establish federal court procedure, at least when such procedure
involves substantive rights.
If the opinion commits this Court to the position that the Con-
gress is without power to declare what rules of substantive law
is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure .... The
Judiciary Article and the "necessary and proper" clause of Article
One may fully authorize legislation, such as this section of the
Judiciary Act.9
A perhaps ironic aftermath of Erie v. Tompkins is that the case was
remanded with directions to proceed in conformity with the Court's
opinion, which by all that can be gleaned .from the specific references
of the Court, required a decision on the negligence law of Pennsylvania.
If in fact the state law was to control, the conflicts rule of the state of
New York (where the case was brought) should have been the prime
concern. This realization came later, however, when in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Co.'0 the Court required, federal Courts in diversity cases to
follow state conflict of law rules.
In removing the Swift v. Tyson dichotomy of general law-local law,
the Court resurrected an equally cumbersome and difficult task for the
federal courts-demarcation of the line between substance and proce-
dure. Demarcation could no longer be side-stepped by holding the matter
to be "general law." Efforts have been made to unravel this Gordian
knot for the last thirty years, but given the present variables at least
another thirty years, of work. remain.
Congress itself may have added to the complexity of the task. At
approximately the same time as the decision in Erie, the Enabling Act 1
resulted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Enabling Act
attempts to put beyond all doubt the authority of the Supreme Court
to propagate rules of procedure for the federal courts.'2
Id. at 78.
8 Id. at 90-92.
9 Id. at 91-92.
10 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
"128 U.S.C. § 723 (b) (1940) Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064.
"2See 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4171 for language supporting broad
rule-making powers recently given the Court; specific legislative history of
[Vol. 52
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The Supreme Court shall have power to prescribe, by general
rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the
courts of this District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil
actions at law. Said rules -shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive right of any litigant. They shall take
effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. 13
By virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts
were at least apparently beginning with the same definition of "proce-
dure" whenever specific facts made it necessary to make the substantive-
procedural distinction required by Erie.
One of the first cases to enunciate the Erie requirement that a line
be drawn between substance and procedure was Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co.'4 At issue here was the validity of a Federal Rule which allowed
the federal court to require a plaintiff to submit to a physical examina-
tion by a court appointed physician. The question arose in a diversity
action in Illinois (which did not allow such court orders) based on an
injury in Indiana (which did permit such orders). The Court suggests
that once a Federal Rule exists on the subject in question, the only issue
which may be raised is the authority of the Court to promulgate such
a rule-which authority is measured by the Enabling Act.
The contention of petitioners, in final analysis, is that Rules 35
and 37 are not within the mandate of Congress to this Court.
This is the limit of permissible debate, since argument touching
the broader questions of Congressional power and of the obliga-
tions of the federal courts to apply the substantive law of a state
is foreclosed.' 5
Had the above reasoning been adhered to, perhaps much less con-
fusion would have subsequently developed. However, another argument
which subsequently found many advocates was advanced by the peti-
tioner. Even assuming the question was procedural because covered by
a Federal Rule, the plaintiff (who opposed the order) contended that
the Rule abridged'a substantial or important right, thus a substantive
right was affected and, consequently, the Federal Rule was beyond the
scope of the Enabling Act. The Court refuses to embark on a case by
case determination of whether a right is "substantial" or "important";
a test is given, however, which appears to be the test for both the
substance-procedure distinction and for the scope of the Enabling Act.
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure-the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
the 1934 Act was not to be found in the resources available to this writer
but it is submitted that numerous lower, court decisions as well as law com-
mentators so interpreted this 1934 grant of authority.
13 28 U.S.C. § 723 (b) (1940) Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651 § 1. 48 Stat. 1064.
14 312 U.S. (1941).
15 Id. at 9.
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substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them.16
Sibbach thus seems to hold that a Federal Rule controls if it is part
of the judicial process for enforcing rights or administering remedies.
Such a test would appear to cloak the Rules with an aura of validity
subject to challenge only when the Rule is beyond the authority of the
Court to promulgate. However, subsequent cases with difficult equities
have caused the Court to embellish, expand, and perhaps confuse this
interpretation.
1 7
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York' was the next case in which the Court
pronounced a test by which to determine whether state law or Federal
Rules control in a diversity action. The action here was equitable; the
plaintiff was seeking to recover for the breach of a fiduciary obligation
involved in a rather complex series of transactions with bonds. Had the
action been brought in the state court, the statute of limitations would
have barred recovery. The Supreme Court concludes that a similar bar
exists as to recovery in the federal courts-the statute of limitations is
substantive. The fact that the action is in equity, however, troubles the
Court. Pronouncements as to the status of equity actions coupled with
the final decision that the statute of limitations must be followed, sug-
gests that the Court may really be delineating "substantial" rather than
strictly "substantive" rights.
In discussing the equitable nature of the action, the Court first sug-
gests that a state limitation of remedy is not binding on the federal
courts.
State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court must
give simply because a federal court in diversity jurisdiction is
available as an alternative tribunal to the State's courts. Con-
trariwise, a federal court may afford an equitable remedy for a
substantive right recognized by a State even though a State court
cannot give it.' 9
However, after citing a prior decision holding the principle of Erie v.
Tompkins applicable to a suit in equity,"0 the Court phrases a new test
for the applicability of State law. Essentially, the Court concludes that
if the State law would determine the outcome of the litigation, it must
be followed.
The language and reasoning of the Court also suggest a concern, as
expressed in Erie, that opportunity for forum shopping shall not be
provided.
16 Id. at 14.
17 It is also possible, if not probable, that the Court has in fact returned es-
sentially to the Sibbach test; see discussion of Hanna v. Plumer, infra.
Is 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19 Id. at 106.
20 Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
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Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived . . . from
one of the States. When, because the plaintiff happens to be a
non-resident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as in
a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at
times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are
not identic. But since a federal court adjudicating a State-created
right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties
is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it
cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable
by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the
right as given by the State. (emphasis added) 2'
Had the Court limited its language to a conclusion that statutes of lim-
itation are substantive, thus binding upon a federal court, future difficul-
ties arising from this decision might have been greatly reduced. The
decision, however, by reference to Erie, goes beyond the facts presented.
The Court's language specifically interpreting Erie attempted to
simplify the problems presented and subsequently became almost talis-
manic, as a test for application of state law.
In essence, the intent of [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins] was to insure
that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
tially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. 22
Perhaps the greatest difficulty inherent in the Guaranty Trust "out-
come determinative" test is its simplicity. The test is a great oversimpli-
fication of the real issue; even the most clearly procedural requirement
imaginable could determine the outcome of the litigation via dismissal.
Suppose, for example, a defendant signed a pleading as the Federal
Rules required, and the state law required that pleadings be affirmed
(and those not affirmed be stricken) ; the outcome of the litigation could
conceivably be determined by following State law. Guaranty Trust seems
to indicate that a federal court in such a situation would have to follow
state law.
Two years later, when faced with a significantly different problem,
the Court evolved something of a variation on the "outcome determina-
tive" test. Angel v. Bullington,23 in effect, concluded that if the State
courts closed their doors to the litigation in question, the federal courts
must follow suit. This broad pronouncement arose from a very narrow
question. The Plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, had been denied recovery
by the supreme court of North Carolina because of a North Carolina
statute which barred defeciency judgments in secured sales of realty.
The plaintiff then started suit on the same claim in the federal court in
21 326 U.S. 99, 108-109 (1945).
22 Id. at 109.
23 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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North Carolina on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court concluded that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case.
The denial of jurisdiction was based on alternative grounds. A
lengthy discussion of res judicata concluded, essentially, that since the
state courts had already decided this specific controversy, the federal
courts could not redecide it. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest
that the Court's antipathy towards forum shopping was given full vent
in this case. Considering the policy expressed in Erie, the Court was
not about to sanction two actions on exactly the same claim.
A further basis for denial of jurisdiction was more explicitly based
on the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins mandate. The Court points out the North
Carolina Supreme Court had authoritatively announced that deficiency
judgments are not available in North Carolina 'courts. Consequently,
the federal courts," through 'diversity jturisdiction, cannot give what the
state courts withhold. Since the state courts have closed their doors to
this litigant on this question, the federal courts must do likewise.
The door-closing test is useful when the issue of res judicata is in-
volved. However, a good argument can be made that the question of res
judicata is entirely' separate from the Erie problem of whether the law
in question is substantive or procedural (which in turn determines
whether state or federal law controls). It is difficult to hypothesize a
situation where both issues could be raised as to the same question of
law. (Concededly both issues.were raised in Angel, but better planning
by counsel could have avoided this situation.) Res Judicata suggests a
determination on the merits of a controversy, while a procedural ques-
tion should not involve the merits of the action at all. Such a distinction,
however, was not engrafted onto the test in Angel, and the "door-
closing" criteria became another talisman for the courts when faced with
an Erie-type question.
What might be regarded as a triumvirate of state law supremacy
developed in 1949. Three cases2 were decided by the Supreme Court
on the same day, and all involved challenges to the Federal Rules on the
basis of contrary state law. In each case the applicability of the state
law was upheld.
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co.25 was discussed as though it turned
on the applicability of the state statute of limitations. However, since
prior cases had concluded that state statutes of limitations were substan-
tive and thus controlling, the only really new issue was whether the
state or federal definition of "commencing an action" was to ojerate to
toll the statute. The Federal Rules deem an action commenced when
24 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) ; Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).25 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
[Vol. 52
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the complaint is filed 26 (indeed, the summons cannot -be served until
the complaint is filed) ; the state law, however, said an action was com-
menced only when the summons was served. Here the plaintiff, invok-
ing diversity jurisdiction, filed well within the period of limitations;
however, the subsequent service upon defendant was not effectively
made until after the statute had run. The Court mentions (but does not
consider it significant) that service was in fact made prior to the ex-
piration of the statutory time, but was, defective and thus had to be
repeated. The significance of the fact that the defendant had actual notice
of the action prior to the expiration of the limitation time was not men-
tioned.2
7
With something less than unimpeachable reasoning, the Court con-
cludes that the state definition of "commencing an action" must control.
The plaintiff is thus barred from any relief in any, court. The Court
accepts the Court of Appeals conclusion "that the requirement of service
of summons within. the statutory period was an integral part of that
state's statute of limitations. '28 In effect what the Court is accepting is
a state conclusion that the service of a summons is a matter of substan-
tive law. There is no discussion whether the Enabling Act authorizes a
definition of "commencement of an action." Thus, the Court is in fact
applying the "substantial" or "important" right criteria it expressly re-
jected in Sibbach v. Wilson.29
The Court then applies the "door closing" interpretation of Erie and
denies plaintiff's recovery.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ...was premised on the theory that
in diversity cases the rights enjoyed under local law should not
vary because enforcement of those rights was sought in the fed-
eral court rather than in the state court. If recovery could not be
had in the state court, it should be denied in the federal court.
It is conceded that if the present case were in a Kansas court
it w6uld be barred.3
0
Since that cause of action is created by local law, the meagure of
it is to be found only in local law. It carries the same burden and
is subject to the same defenses in the federal court as in the su-
preme cotirt .... It accrues and comes to an end when local law
so declares .... When local law qualifies or abridges it, the fed-
eral court must follow suit.31
The language here is broad enough to suggest that any qualification
or abridgement of a cause of action by a state must be followed by the
federal courts, even when there is a Federal Rule that reaches another
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
27 Actual notice, rather than the particular form by which it is given, now appears
to be the significant factor. See discussion of Hanna v. Pluner, infra.
28 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949).
29 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
30 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949).
31 Id. at 533.
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conclusion or establishes another criterion. Indeed, on the facts of this
case, such an interpretation is not unreasonable.
Perhaps the other cases decided on the same day limit the broad
sweep of Ragan. (However, as there were three separate opinions, the
argument is better that the other cases expand the Ragan holding).
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.32 involves a state statute which requires
a foreign corporation doing business in the state to designate an agent
on whom service of process may be made, and, if such is not done,
denies the right "to bring or maintain any action or suit in any of the
courts of this state." The Supreme Court concludes, largely on the
authority of Angel v. Bullington,33 that since the state has closed its
doors to the plaintiff foreign corporation, the federal courts must adopt
the same course.
The dissent in Woods takes issue with the majority for not adhering
to their normal position that the lower court's interpretation of state
law will be accepted. Here, the Court of Appeals had concluded that the
statute was interpreted by the state only to deny state court enforcement
to contracts of such foreign corporations; all other remedies were left
unimpaired. Thus, the dissent concluded, the federal court had full
authority to adjudicate the contract. To conclude otherwise, it is argued,
would be to give the state statute a different meaning in the federal
court than it had in the state courts.
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. was the final member of
the trilogy. Here the Court was faced with the question of applicability
of a state statute requiring a bond to be posted as a condition precedent
to litigation by certain stockholders in stockholder derivative actions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure listed facts required before such an
action could be brought, but did not mention a bond. The Court upholds
the bond requirement, and suggests that Erie goes so far as to make
state law controlling in all but the details relating to the conduct of the
court business.
But Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny have wrought a
more far-reaching change in the relationship of state and federal
courts and in the application of state law in the latter whereby in
diversity cases the federal court administers the state system of
law in all except details related to its own conduct of business.35
The Court further reasons that even if the requirement of bond is
only procedural, it still applies because it is the creation of a liability
where none before existed, which in fact is a substantive matter. The
Court does engage in a lengthy discussion of stockholder derivative ac-
tions, the abuses which grew therefrom, and the logic of the policy which
32337 U.S. 535 (1949).
3 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
34337 U.S. 541 (1949).
35 Id. at 555.
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the state is enunciating in the bond requirement. In this context, the
Court makes a statement which may prove to be the key to the rationale
of all three decisions:
"A state may set the terms on which it will permit litigations
in its courts." 38
This statement, in view of the prior decisions enforcing the "door-
closing" test of applicability of state law, suggests that the court is really
approaching a question of jurisdiction in the guise of a substance v.
procedure determination.
The partial dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Frank-
furter hints at the necessity of making a distinction between jurisdiction-
al questions and Erie-type questions.
Each state has numerous regulations governing the institution of
suits in its courts. They may favor the litigation or they may
affect it adversely. But they do not fall under the principle of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins... unless they define, qualify or delimit
the cause of action or otherwise relate to itA
T
The dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge, however, may be the harbinger
of what appears to be the current attitude of the court. The dissent is
specifically made applicable to the entire trilogy, which he aptly categor-
izes.
I think the three decisions taken together demonstrate the
extreme extent to which the Court is going in submitting the
control of diversity litigation in the federal courts to the states
rather than to Congress, where it properly belongs. 38
He further suggests that something foreign to the Erie doctrine is being
applied, and that cases subsequent to Erie may be misconceived.
What is being applied is a gloss on the Erie rule, not the rule
itself .... There is sound historical reason for believing that one
of the purposes of the diversity clause was to afford a federal
court remedy when, for at least some reasons of state policy,
none would be available in the state courts.3 9
On the question of the substance-procedure problem, the dissent sug-
gests a test which is perhaps more relevant to the real issues which
contront the Court:
The accepted dichotomy is the familiar "procedural-substantive
one. . . . [I]t is Congress which has the power to govern the
procedure of the federal courts in diversity cases, and the states
which have that power over matters clearly substantive in nature.
The real question is not whether the separation shall be nade,
but how it shall be made; whether mechanically by reference to
36 Id. at 552.
37 Id. at 557.
381d. at 558.
39 Ibid.
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whether the state courts' doors are open or closed, or by a consid-
eration of the policies which close them and their relation to
accommodating the policy of the Erie rule with Congress' power
to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits. (emphasis
added) 40
The test suggested is explained by reference to the Cohen case,41 involv-
ing state statute requiring a bond as a condition precedent to stockholder
litigation.
Whether or not the [statute in Cohen] is conceived as creating
a new substantive right, it is too close to controlling the incidents
of litigation rather than its outcome .... It is a matter which in
my opinion lies within Congress' control for diversity cases, not
one for state control or to be governed by the fact that the state
shut the doors of its courts unless the state requirements concern-
ing such incidents of litigation are complied with.4 2
This reasoning and test suggested by Justice Rutledge can perhaps
be paraphrased in the following manner: (1) Congress clearly has the
authority to control the incidents of litigation (procedure) in the federal
courts. (2) State law controls in diversity cases only when it is sub-
stantive law. (3) Since almost any state statute could, if carried to its
logical extreme, be considered as creating a substantive right, the real
question is whether it affects an incident of litigation. (4) If the statute
in question is designed to control the manner of litigation (rather than
being principally designed to affect the outcome), it must yield to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If this is a fair interpretation of the criteria Mr. Justice Rutledge
advocated, his suggestions were, to some extent, adopted, at least sub
silentio, by the Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.43 and in Hanna v. Plumer.4 4 The Court appears to
have done something of an about-face and concluded that there are
areas of law in which federal policy requires that the Federal Rules be
followed, even if the state law in question is arguably substantive.
The Byrd45 case reached the Court in 1958. The controversy centered
around the state definition of "employer" for Workmen's Compensation.
Plaintiff, who was injured while working on defendant's property, sued
the out-of-state corporation in the federal district court. The defendant
contended, as a defense, that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the
state Workmen's Compensation Act since the defendant was within
such statutores definition of "employer." However, in order to be within
that definition, it was clear that certain facts had to exist. Had the action
40 Id. at 559.
41 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
42 Id. at 560.
43356 U.S. 525 (1958).
44380 U.S. 460 (1965).
4 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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been begun in the state judicial system, a finding of fact would have been
made by the Industrial Commission prior to consideration by a court.
Thus, facts to make the statute applicable would have been found prior
to any possibility of a jury consideration of other issues.
In Byrd, the Court held that the federal policy in favor of a jury
trial controlled as against a state court holding that facts making appli-
cable the statute in question were solely within the province of the court
to decide. This conclusion is reached by a somewhat complex syllogism
involving a re-interpretation of Erie and Guarantee Trust.
First. It was decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that the federal
courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-
created rights and obligations by the state courts. We must, there-
fore, first examine the rule in [the state case] to determine
whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations in such
a way that its application in the federal court is required.
We find nothing to suggest that this rule was announced as an
integral part of the special relationship created by the statute.
Thus the requirement appears to be merely a form and mode of
enforcing the immunity ... and not a rule intended to be bound
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties.46
Second. But cases following Erie have evinced a broader policy
to the effect that the federal courts should conform as near as
may be-in the absence of other considerations-to state rules
even of form and mode where the state rules may bear substan-
tially on the question whether the litigation would come out one
way in the federal court and another way in the state court if
the federal court failed to apply the local rule.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. The federal system is an independent system for adminis-
tering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An
essential characteristic of that system' is the manner in which,
in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between
judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command-
of the Seven Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed ques-
tions of fact to the jury.4 7 (emphasis added)
Third. We have discussed the problem upon the assumption that
the outcome of the litigation may be substantially affected by
whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury.
* * * We do not think the likelihood of a different result is so
strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of
disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of
uniformity of outcome.48
The "affirmative countervailing considerations" which the court
enumerates amount, essentially, to federal policy (which includes the
authority of the federal courts to control the incidents of litigation).
By making the "outcome of the litigation" the last to be considered, the
46 Id. at 535-536.
47 Id. at 536-537.
48 Id. at 539-540.
19681
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
change in approach is clear; if a Federal Rule applies to the situation,
and if there is an affirmative federal policy supporting such Rule, then
the state rule will not be followed, even if it might substantially affect
the outcome of the litigation. The fact that the right to a jury trial was
involved should not change the complexion of the decision; the Court
expressly disclaims any suggestion that it is deciding this case on the
basis of a constitutional mandate. 49
Even the most conservative reading of Byrd cannot but admit the
greater weight given to federal policy and the independence of the fed-
eral judicial system. Although, of course, lower court decisions were
far from unanimous, a tendency to accord greater significance to the
Federal Rules was becoming evident. In numerous instances the Federal
Rules were upheld, for example, against the onslaught of state rules
of evidence, 50 and of substitution of parties. 51
Perhaps the most emphatic (and dramatic) expression of support
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was made by the United States
Supreme Court, itself, in Hanna v. Plumer,52 decided in 1965. At issue
here was the validity of service of process when executed in exact com-
pliance with the Federal Rules (and consequently, the validity of the
method of invoking a federal court's jurisdiction was also at stake).
The defendant administrator, who was served according to Rule 4 (d)
(1), contended that the service was invalid under a state statute requir-
ing in-hand service on an executor or administrator (or filing with the
probate court). Had the Court upheld the defendant's contention, the
statute of iimitations would have prevented further action by the plain-
tiff.
In a lengthy and significant footnote,53 the Court evaluates the state
policy upon which the in-hand service requirement is based. Finding
that actual notice is the controlling state policy, and that the defendant
does not claim lack of actual notice, the Court concludes that the Federal
Rule controls the action since it is based on the same policy. A test for
the validity of a challenged federal rule is set out, which sounds remark-
ably like the test that appeared to be adopted in Sibbach v. Wilson"
some twenty-four years before.
We conclude that the adoption of Rule 4 (d) (1), designed to
control service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded
the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act
nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is
49 Id. at 537, footnote 10.
50 Hope v. Hearst Consolidated Publications, 294 F.2d 681 (1961) ; Monarch Ins.
Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (1960).
51 Jovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (1959).
52380 U.S. 460 (1965).
53 Id. at 462-463, footnote 1.
54312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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therefore the standard against which the District Court should
have measured the adequacy of the service.
55
The Court realizes that this is not in complete accord with all the
prior interpretations given to the Erie decision. To an extent the prior
decisions are re-interpreted and to extent modified. The overall concern
with forum shopping is apparent.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . .. overruling Swift v. Tyson ...
held that federal courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding
questions of "substantive" law, are bound by state court decisions
as well as state statutes. The broad command of Erie was there-
fore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.56 (em-
phasis added).
"Outcome-determination" analysis was never intended to serve
as a talisman. . . . Indeed, the message of York itself is that
choices between state and federal law are to be made not by
application of any automatic, "litmus paper" criterion, but rather
by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.57
The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be
unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to
differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court....
The decision was also in part a reaction to the practice of "forum-
shopping" which had grown up in response to the rule of Swift
v. Tyson.
58
At this point, the Court begins applying the above reasoning to the
facts of this case. First the court notes that the anti-forum-shopping
policy of Erie will not be defeated by application of the Federal Rule in
question because, as opposed to the state rule advanced, "the difference
between the two rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice
of a forum."5 9 Then the Court concludes that, even if it would effect
the choice of forum, Erie and York are not the proper criteria by which
to measure the validity, and thus the applicability of a Federal Rule.
On the basis of this reasoning, the test Hanna directs to be applied to a
Federal Rule is virtually as stated in Sibbach v. Wilson.6 °
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the
Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Com-
mittee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judg-
ment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of
the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.6
5 Id. at 463-464.
56 Id. at 465.
5 Id. at 466-467.
58 Id. at 467.
5 1 d. at 469.
60 312 U.S. 1 (1941).6t Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
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This standard, as the concurring opinion points out, makes it virtu-
ally impossible to defeat any federal rule. And further, this test is to
be applied to "matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification
as either. '62 Presumably, since the Court, Advisory Committee and
Congress are all rational men, and have classified all the rules as pro-
cedural, all such rules are invincible. The concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan suggests another test which he argues would not cloak
the Rules with invincibility, and would give the necessary weight to
both state policy and the anti-forum-shopping policy of the Court. Weight
should be given, he suggests, to "a State's substantive regulation of the
primary conduct and affairs of its citizens."6 3 Essentially, he would have
the Federal Ruly apply when "[t] he choice of the Federal Rule would
have ... no effect on the primary stages of private activity from which
the (action) arises, and only the most minimal effect on behavior fol-
lowing. . . ."" Conversely, the Federal Rule would give way to the
state law when the state law . . . "was designed and could be expected
to have a substantial impact on private primary activity." 65
II. BASIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-ARM STATUTES
The advent and evolution of the Erie doctrine is perhaps related
and analogous to the development of the present long-arm statutes. For
clarity of presentation, the development and expansion of state jurisdic-
tion will be discussed first, then relations between the long-arm and
Erie will be suggested.
A. Federal Development
Congress has long given federal district courts diversity jurisdiction
(when there is no federal question involved) through various statutes,
culminating presently in 28 U.S.C. § 1332:
(a) The district court-shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy ... is between-
(1) Citizens of different States;
(2) Citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof ; and
(3) Citizens of different States and in which foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
Without more, this grant of jurisdiction is limited only by the ruling
in Strawbridge v. Curtis66 that no one state or its citizens may be on
both sides of a diversity action. The methods available by which to
invoke this jurisdiction have, however, served as a limiting factor.
62 Id. at 472.
63d at 476.
64 Id. at 477.
65 Ibid.
66 3 Cranch 267 (1806).
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Federal diversity jurisdiction is invoked by the service of process.6 7
Amenability to service is limited by several factors. First, the Federal
Rules themselves determine the scope of federal process. In certain
instances, however, the Federal Rules specifically incorporate state law.
Consequently, the effective limit of state process is also an effective limit
on the process of a federal court sitting in that state.
Since the Federal Rules incorporate state law as to service of process,
and since it would not appear that state process can be validly served
unless the state has jurisdiction, the scope of state jurisdiction over non-
residents is highly relevant in federal diversity cases. A brief discussion
of the major theories upon which state jurisdiction has been delineated
is necessary in order to discuss the implications of Erie on state long-
arm statutes.
Perhaps the classic starting point in a summary of the scope of state
jurisdiction is Pennoyer v. Neff.68 Here a plaintiff had sued a non-
resident defendant in a state court. The defendant was "served" only
by publication. After a default judgment, property within the -state
owned by the defendant was levied upon and sold in satisfaction of the
default judgment. Title to this property was challenged in the federal
court on the grounds that the state had no jurisdiction to enter the
judgment pursuant to which title was transferred.
The Supreme Court concludes that personal jurisdiction was not
attained over the non-resident when notice was given only by publica-
tion. It is further suggested that any form of constructive service would
be insufficient to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident.
The several states are of equal dignity and authority, and the
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary princi-
ple, that the laws of one state have no operation outside of its
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tri-
bunal established by it can extend its process beyond that terri-
tory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. 69
Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized
form, may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of pro-
ceedings taken where property is once brought under the control
of the court by seizure or some equivalent act. . . . But where
the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights
and obligations of the defendants, that is, where the .suit is merely
in personam, constructive service in this form upon a non-resident
is ineffectual for any purpose.70 (emphasis added)
Other language, however, suggests that it is merely the aspect of serv-
ice by publication and resulting potential for abuse which the court finds
traumatic.
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d). (2), (7), (4(e).
68 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
69 Id. at 722.
70 Id. at 727.
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If, without personal service, judgments in personan, obtained
ex parte against non-residents . . . upon mere publication of
process, which, in the great majority of cases, would never be
seen by the parties interested, could be upheld and enforced, they
would be the constant instruments of fraud and oppression. 71
The position that personal jurisdiction could not be obtained over
a non-resident in any manner other than by personal service within the
forum state proved too strict a doctrine to meet the needs of a progres-
sively more mobile society. Indeed, as much fraud was perhaps caused
by this doctrine as it sought to avoid; the mere process of leaving and
remaining out of state negated all personal liability which might have
been incurred within the state. Consequently, the Court substantially
changed its position in Hess v. Pawloski.72
The Hess decision could well be categorized as the first federal
scrutiny of a "long-arm" statute. Here a Pennsylvania resident, while
operating an automobile on Massachusetts highways, struck and injured
a resident of Massachusetts. A Massachusetts statute provided that any
such non-residents were deemed to have appointed a specific state officer
as the agent for service of process in any action resulting from an acci-
dent or collision in Massachusetts involving the non-resident. The
statute further required mailing the process to the non-resident, attach-
ing the return receipt to the court record, and allowing the defendant
reasonable opportunity to return and defend.
This exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident was held
to be compatible with Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The validity of the statute is predicated largely on the police power of
the state, which by implication justifies the fiction that a non-resident
"appoints" an agent upon whom process may be served.
In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents
and non-residents alike, who use its highways. . . .And, in ad-
vance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a
non-resident, the State may require him to appoint one of its
officials as his agent on whom process may be served in proceed-
ings growing out of such use. 73
The argument that the fiction of appointment is incompatible with due
process is dismissed summarily. "The difference between the formal and
implied appointment is not substantial so far as concerns the application
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 74
71 Id. at 726.
72 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
73 Id. at 356.
74 Id. at 357.
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In view of the Pennoyere5 language, which suggested that only pres-
ence within the state or citizenship would support personal jurisdiction,
the use of a fictional "agent" theory in Hess is understandable if not
justifiable. The greatest difficulty in using an "agent" to establish
"presence" is that there is no logical limit to the doctrine. The reasoning
in Hess logically implies that once a state interest is found in the activi-
ties of a non-resident, police power may be applied, an "agent" desig-
nated by legislative fiat, and the non-resident subjected to the state's
jurisdiction. The "agent" fiction was necessary so long as the require-
ment of "presence" remained a prerequisite to valid service of process.
Modifications of the agency theory soon developed, and the requirement
of "presence" evolved some very different notions.
An effort to avoid the fiction of "presence" was evident in Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington.78 At issue here was whether a foreign cor-
poration, which had no office in the state and technically executed no
contracts within the state, was subject to process to enforce the state's
Unemployment Compensation tax. Process was served by mailing notice,
by registered mail, to the employer at his last known address. The
activities of the corporation within the state consisted of employing
three salesmen to exhibit samples and solicit orders within the state
(which orders could be accepted only by the corporation in an office
in another state).
The Court dismisses as without merit the contention that the state
statute is a burden on interstate commerce. It then proceeds to demolish
the argument that the corporation was not "present" in the state.
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to per-
sonal service of summons or other forms of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
To say that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy
due process requirements, for the purposes of taxation and the
maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to
beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or "pres-
ence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corpor-
ation's agents within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.7 7
In attempting to delineate the requisite contacts to satisfy due process,
the Court also suggests limitations on the state's jurisdiction. "Continu-
ous and systematic"78 activity will support jurisdiction; "casual presence
7 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
76 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77 Id. at 316-317.
78 Id. at 317.
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of a corporate agent" 79 or "single or isolated items of activities" '8 will
not, however, when the action is unconnected with the activities. (This
apparent limitation may in fact be an expansion of jurisdiction.) The
test of due process which the Court ennunciates, however, serves only
to suggest potential vague limitations.
The test is not merely. . . whether the activity, which the corpor-
ation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state,
is a little more or a little less. . . . Whether due process is satis-
fied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding
a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate de-
fendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.81
In retrospect, what the Court has to say, at this time about the re-
quirements of notice is perhaps suggestive of an approach later taken.
We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process
within the state upon an agent whose activities establish appel-
lants "presence" there was not sufficient notice of the suit, or that
the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to make the agent
an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It is
enough that appellant has established such contacts with the
state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there
gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual ...
Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant
by registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated
to apprise appellant of the suit. 2 (emphasis added)
International Shoe, then, appears to stand for the proposition that
diversity jurisdiction, which relies on state jurisdiction over the defen-
dant, may be invoked when (1) the defendant has sufficient minimal
contacts with the forum state (perhaps of a continuous and systematic
nature) so that the traditional concepts of fair play and substantial
justice are not offended, and (2) notice of the action is reasonably
likely to be actual notice.
This hint at the importance of notice was made abundantly clear
a few years later in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust.5 3 At
issue here is the constitutional validity of state provisions for termina-
tion of a common trust fund. The notice required by the state statute
was service by publication for all persons beneficially interested.
The Supreme Court recognizes the state interest in regulating com-
mon trust funds, and the termination thereof. It points out, however,
79 Ibid.
so Ibid.
Sl Id. at 319.
82 Id. at 320. For similar language respecting requirements of notice, see Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
83 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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that labeling an action in rem or in personarn is not really relevant in
determining whether the service requirements satisfy the mandates of
due process. Notice, as close as possible to actual notice, considering
all the facts and circumstances, is what due process requires.
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections.
The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey the
required information . . . and it must afford a reasonable time
for those interested to make their appearance .... 14
The Court then measures notice by publication against the requirements
of due process and finds it sufficient only as to "those beneficiaries ...
whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligencd be ascer-
tained." 5
The Mullane requirements as to notice seem equally applicable ac-
tions involving non-residents in other situations. Indeed, the Interna-
tional Shoe"6 case hinted at this conclusion. At "this point, the fiction
requiring appointment of an agent for service of process has logically
been discredited.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.87 also abandons the agency
fiction, and reiterates that neither "presence" nor "doing business" is
the proper test for a state's assertion of valid personal jurisdiction. The
facts of this case make it, to date, the Supreme Court's outer-limit of
the minimal contact criterion. A California resident purchased life in-
surance from an Arizona corporation; the Arizona corporation was
purchased by a Texas company and the Californian executed a rein-
surance contract with the Texas insurers. The reinsurance contract
was offered by the Texas company by mail and was the only contract
it had in the state of California. The premiums were received in Texas
by mail from California.
When the Texas insurance company refused to pay the beneficiary
(resident of California) after the death of the insured, suit was brought
in California. The state statute under which suit was brought allowed
action against foreign insurance corporations on contracts with residents
of California, even if the corporation could not be served with process
in the state. Notice of the California action was given by registered
mail at the principal place of business in Texas. The Supreme Court
held that the California judgment thus obtained was valid and entitled-
to enforcement in Texas by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit require-
84 Id. at 314.
s5 Id. at 317.
86 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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ment of the Constitution. The language of the Court suggests a concern
with the special nature of insurance contracts, but nonetheless implies
a broad basis for state jurisdiction.
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based
on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.
• . . It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a
severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance
company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants fre-
quently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a forum
-thius in effect making the company judgment proof.8
The statement in International Shoe,8 9 to the effect that inconveni-
ence of the forum would be factor in determining whether due process
is violated, appears to be limited by McGee language.
Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held
amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but cer-
tainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.90 (em-
phasis added)
It might be suggested that inconvenience of forum is a risk assumed by
those engaging in the insurance business in states other than that of
its principal place of business.
The broad sweep of McGee was neutralized somewhat by the later
decision in Hanson v. Denckla.91 Here, essentially, Florida sought to
invoke jurisdiction over a Delaware trust corporation on the basis of
a trust agreement executed in Delaware by a resident of Pennsylvania
who later became a resident of Florida. Payments from the trust, the
assets of which were in Delaware, were made by the Delaware trustee
and were received in Florida; the Florida resident exercised some con-
trol over the trust, otherwise there was no contact by the Delaware
corporation with the state of Florida. The Court mentions the trend
toward expanding personal jurisdiction, which was noted in McGee
and was derived from International Shoe, but concludes that this trend
is not as all-encompassing as it might appear.
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the
state courts. . . . Those restrictions are more than a guarantee
of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respec-
tive States.92
88 Id. at 223.
89 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
90 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
91357 U.S. 235 (1958).
92 Id. at 251.
[Vol. 52
The Court denies the validity of jurisdiction by Florida over the
Delaware corporation and distinguishes this case and McGee: "The
cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act done or
transaction consummated in the forum State. In that respect, it differs
from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co." 93 The factor in McGee
which is significant by its absence in Hanson, is the element of solicita-
tion by the defendant of the contact upon which jurisdiction is predi-
cated. The Court wisely concludes that "[t]he unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.
' 94
Three justices dissent on the basis that the party who executed the
trust in question was domiciled in Florida at the time of such execution.
This suggests that a different view of the facts could well give a different
result, which, of course, makes the facts upon which jurisdiction is
sought to be established tremendously important. It also indicates that
a case by case determination will be necessary.
B. Wisconsin Developments
With the Court sustaining what appears to be ever broader state
jurisdiction over non-residents, many states have adopted statutes which
attempt to codify this expanded jurisdiction. The Wisconsin approach
to the problem, which is not at all typical, was to write the broadest
possible jurisdictional statute 5 assuming it may be limited by future
pronouncements of the courts as to the scope of due process. Wisconsin
attempts to predicate jurisdiction on any of the following:
(1) local presence or status, which includes residents, domiciliar-
ies, domestic corporations, and activities within the state;
(2) other statutes which provide jurisdiction through special
proceedings, such as licensing of foreign corporations;
(3) an act or omission within this state causing injury either
within or without the state;
(4) an act or omission without the state resulting in injury
within this state when solicitation, services, or products of de-
fendant in the ordinary course of trade were in this state;
(5) a contract for goods or services which is connected with a
resident of this state (regardless of where the contract originated
or was to be performed, so long as some performance or promise
is in this state) ;
(6) an action involving property in this state;
(7) a deficiency judgment on local foreclosure or resale;
(8) an insurance contract when the event insured against occurs
in this state or when the event occurs while the beneficiary is
resident of this state;
(9) special situations involving corporate officers and taxes.
03 Ibid.
94 Id. at 253.
Or Wis. STAT. 262.05 (1965); repealed and re-created by Wis. LAwS 1959, ch.
226, § 15, eff. July 1, 1960. For manner of invoking jurisdiction see 262.06
Wis. STATS. (1965).
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The Revision Notes 6 to this statute clearly indicate the intent of
the drafters to make this statute as broad as possible, consistent with
the requirements of due process. In fact, this intent has been attributed
to the legislation, on the authority of these Notes, by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.9 7 Generally, the approach can be described as an attempt
to cover every situaiton where there would be any contact with the
state, then allow the courts to carve out those contacts which do not
satisfy due process, and, conversely, fill-in the concrete situations which
are within the language of the statute and satisfy due process.
Since the Federal Rules have incorporated state statutes on juris-
diction by specific reference, 98 and since the Erie doctrine requires that
the federal courts follow state court interpretations of its own statutes,
the construction' placed on sections 262.05 and 262.06 of the Wisconsin
Statutes by the Wisconsin Supreme Court is highly relevant. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has had several occasions to interpret this
statute. Considered chronologically, there appears to be no noticeable
tendency on the part of the court either to expand the boundries of
the statute, or to limit them; a pendulum approach might be the best
description of an overview of the decisions.
Punke v. Brody"9 is the first case which turned 'on the interpretation
of the new long-arm statute. Here the defendant, a non-resident, had
hired a resident to manage several properties in the State of Wisconsin
for him. Service was attempted on this agent, but held invalid by the
court. At this point, the court appears to be construing the statute
strictly.
The service is invalidated because the court finds no affirmative
consent by the principal to service on the agent. It is possible that the
lack of other jurisdictional allegations required (or allowed) by the
statute made the court feel that it would promote abuse of the statute
as a whole if it did not strictly interpret the "consent" upon which juris-
diction could be predicated. The counter-argument however, is that all
a principal would need to do to remain immune from suit would be to
affirmatively prohibit his agent from accepting process. The court further
suggests that if the statute did specifically authorize service on such an
agent, and the cause of action arose from the activities he supervised,
it might be constitutionally permissible.
It may be that a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident who supervises the local activity out of which the
cause of action arose would transgress no constitutional limita-
tions. The statute did not so provide, however, and when a statute
9630 Wis. STATS. ANN. 262.05, Revision Notes, G. W. Foster, Jr., 1967.
97 See quotations from Revision Notes in Flambeau Plastics v. King Bee M[anu-
facturing Co., 24 Wis. 2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964) ; Pavalon v. Fishman,
30 Wis. 2d 228, 140 N.W.2d 263 (1966).98See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and (e).
99 17 Wis. 2d 9, 115 N.W.2d 601 (1962).
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prescribes how service is to be made, the statute determines the
matter even though a different method might have been properly
prescribed. 100
Two years later, the court was faced with a far more complex case,
in which the question of jurisdiction was virtually ignored; the holding
of the trial court that jurisdiction was valid was accepted with the mere
statement that the facts supported the conclusion. This resulted in a
de facto expansion of jurisdiction under the statute. Carothers v. Bauer'0 '
was a personal injury action arising from a collision in Minnesota in-
volving a Wisconsin resident and a truck driven by one Komro. The
status of Komro was the subject of much dispute. Suit was instituted
against both IKomro and his employer, the Minnesota corporation. The
corporation contended that Wisconsin lacked jurisdiction as to it be-
cause of insufficient contacts with the state; in addition, it was contended
that Komro was an independent contractor rather than employee. The
bulk of the opinion is devoted to a determination that Komro was an
independent contractor, and the resulting liability of the corporation vis
a vis this status.
Although the action was dismissed on the merits as to the corpora-
tion, the mere acknowledgment of jurisdiction as to that corporation
allows somewhat revolutionary interpretations of the jurisdiction statute.
The Supreme Court held only that the facts supported the trial court's
finding that 262.05 (1) (d) provided jurisdiction. The facts included a
finding that Komro, through whom the bulk of the current contacts with
Wisconsin were made, was an independent contractor. Given this fact,
the only other contact was through a minor company official who rode
the milk run with Komro once a month. Recited as further facts, how-
ever, which apparently were deemed to be a basis for jurisdiction, were
several contacts (i.e. regular milk route) several years before, when
Komro was an employee of the corporation. Thus, in fact, the court
seems to be allowing jurisdiction over a non-resident to be predicated on
either (1) the activity of an independent contractor for such non-resi-
dent, or (2) once a month checking on the contractor's activities by a
company official, or (3) prior activities of the company, out of which
the cause of action did not arise. To call this an expansion of the juris-
dictional sweep of 262.05 would be an understatement.
The next case before the court, however, further expanded the con-
cepts embraced in Wisconsin's long-arm provisions. This case was
decided the same year as Carothers, and, thus, may merely indicate the
then-current attitude of the court rather than a decisional trend. Flam-
beau Plastics v. King Bee Manufacturing Co.10 2 was a breach of contract
action brought by a Wisconsin seller against an Illinois buyer. The
100 Id. at 13.
'123 Wis. 2d 15 (1964), 126 N.W.2d 758 (1964).
102 24 Wis. 2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964).
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contract was negotiated and executed by correspondence. Defendant
had no office or agent in Wisconsin. The products involved were to be
manufactured, shipped, and paid for in Wisconsin. After partial per-
formance, the defendant refused to perform further. The defendant was
served by leaving the summons and complain with defendant's regis-
tered agent at his office in Illinois.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically does not decide whether
the defendant's contract alone is sufficient to give Wisconsin jurisdiction
over him, but does express doubt that such would be sufficient if the
cause of action was unrelated to the contact alleged. The court concludes
that jurisdiction under 262.05 (5) is clear.
In our opinion, the action set forth in the complaint arises out
of a promise by defendant to pay for services to be performed by
plaintiff in Wisconsin, and, thus, that par. (a) of sec. 262.05
(5) Stats. describes a ground for personal jurisdiction. .. . For
the purpose of measuring the extent of defendant's contact with
Wisconsin, its alleged obligation to pay part of the cost of the
mold "arises" out of the original promise .... It is also immate-
rial that the contract required payment upon delivery of the
finished goods, since it is alleged that the parties contemplated that
the goods to be purchased would be produced by plaintiff's
manufacturing efforts in Wisconsin. In light of the purposes of
the statute, a promise to pay for goods to be manufactured by the
seller in Wisconsin must be deemed a promise to pay for the
services of the seller as well as the transfer of the finished prod-
uct.
10 3
It appears that the defendant here in fact had no contact with the
state of Wisconsin other than the contract involved in the suit; other-
wise, jurisdiction could have been established without resort to the
legal inventiveness above set out. This in turn suggests that the Wis-
consin court is not anxious to specifically hold that a single contract
supports jurisdiction, but is willing to attribute broad scope to the other
aspects of the statute. Thus, the single-contract contact does not suffer
from the same potential difficulties in the mind of the court when such
contract includes other jurisdictional elements specifically written into
the statutes.
However, all the 1964 decisions did not expand the scope of 262.05.
Travelers Insurance Co. v. George McArthur & Sons104 denied the
applicability of long-arm jurisdiction. The defendant, a Wisconsin
corporation, manufactured hammocks and sold them to a Connecticut
firm. One of the hammocks was defective and the Connecticut firm paid
its customer on the resulting warranty action. Reimbursement from the
Wisconsin manufacturer was sought by the Connecticut firm's insurer.
As a defense, the Wisconsin defendant sought to implead the Pennsyl-
103 Id. at 466.
104 25 Wis. 2d 197, 130 N.W.2d 852 (1964).
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vania maker of the hammock frames; however, a difficulty arose because
the frames had been sent directly to Connecticut (by the Pennsylvania
maker) at the request of, and under contract with, the Wisconsin de-
fendant.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to extend jurisdiction to the
Pennsylvania party on the allegation of this single contract. The contract
was held to be neither "substantial and not isolated activity" nor "con-
tinuous and systematic" activity. The court further rejects the somewhat
obtuse argument that "in the ordinary course of business" the goods
were sent to Connecticut, but the contract was also part of "the ordinary
course of business" and could thus support jurisdiction as "substantial
and not isolated activities within this state."10 5 The court clearly implies
that it might reach a different result if a greater connection with Wis-
consin on the part of the Pennsylvania firm could be alleged. This op-
portunity is provided by remand.
On the facts of this case, Wisconsin has met its single-contract and
related cause of action case. Jurisdiction was not extended here. But
neither was it decided that a single contract could never support juris-
diction. It is significant that the court did not choose to meet head-on the
statutory provision which appears to allow a single contract (without
more) to provide jurisdiction.10 6 Thus, a case by case determination of
whether a given single contract establishes sufficient contact with the
state to provide jurisdiction-i.e. satisfy due process-will be necessary.
Pavalon v. Fishma 07 was a later case, again apparently involving
a single contract. Fishman (a non-resident) solicited and sold to Pava-
lon (a Wisconsin resident) bonds issued by Sulray (a New York cor-
poration). In an action for fraud and misrepresentation, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court sustains jurisdiction as to Sulray through a much modi-
fied version of the "agency" theory discussed in Punke v. Brody.108
The language of the Court in Pavalon best summarizes its position.
Respondent appears to concede ... that Sulray cannot be reached
directly under sec. 262.05 (5) (e) Stats. This would be because
(1) no one from Sulray did any bargaining, soliciting, or
negotiating with respondent, (2) Suiray did not make any of the
promises or representations which give rise to this action for
misrepresentation, and (3) there was no affirmative showing
that the loan arrangement contemplated a substantial contact with
the state as far as Sulray is concerned. Rather, respondent con-
tends, and the trial court in fact found, as a conclusion of law,
that there was personal jurisdiction over SuIray because Divine
& Fishinan was acting as its agent. If this was actually the case,the actions of Divine & Fishman would be attributed to Suiray,
105 Cf. Wis. STATS. 262.05 (1) (d) (1965).
106 WIs. STATS. 262.05 (5) (1965).
107 30 Wis. 2d 228, 140 N.W.2d 263 (1966).
108 17 Wis. 2d 9, 115 N.W.2d 601 (1962).
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and Sulray would come within the purview of § 262.05 (5) (e).
Consequently, whether or not the trial court had personal juris-
diction of Sulray hinges on the underlying issue of whether
Divine & Fishman were acting as the former's agent.10 9 (empha-
sis added)
The court then applies the Wisconsin rule that a broker acts as an
agent, finds no showing to defeat the agency here, and affirms jurisdic-
tion. There was no discussion of the Brody 1 9 requirement that an ad-
mitted agent must have specific authority to accept service; such
requirement may no longer exist.
Perhaps the most startling instance in which Wisconsin has exer-
cised jurisdiction over non-residents is a recent case where the issue of
jurisdiction was not raised. Conklin v. Homer"' dealt with an Illinois
host and an Illinois guest involved in an automobile accident during a
sojourn into Wisconsin. The plaintiff demurred to the affirmative defense
that Illinois law controlled. The entire opinion discussed whether the
Illinois or Wisconsin host-guest responsibility applied. Wisconsin con-
cluded that since the accident and the injury occurred in Wisconsin,
Wisconsin law applied and sustained the demurrer to the affirmative
defense.
This is the clearest case imaginable of forum shopping. The Illinois
rule was much more strict, so the action was brought in Wisconsin. The
failure to discuss the jurisdictional question, together with application
of Wisconsin law, suggests a new potential for selecting the state with
the most favorable- law. Wisconsin is apparently not disposed to dis-
courage such "shopping."
Since under Erie and its progeny, federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction must apply state substantive law, and since the Federal
Rules have incorporated by reference the scope of state jurisdiction,
federal courts in Wisconsin must follow Wisconsin's interpretation of
262.05 and 262.06 to the extent it does not violate due process.
One potential limitation to this syllogism should, however, be
suggested. The federal rules incorporating state law deal with service
of process. Wisconsin had recognized the distinction between 262.05
(which provides jurisdiction) and 262.06 (which directs how service
shall be made to invoke such jurisdiction). Service, on its face, accord-
ing to the terms of 262.06 does not per se preclude lack of personal
jurisdiction."' This would suggest that the federal court could consider
itself bound only by the method of service in Wisconsin, and not the
personal jurisdiction statute. However, the Supreme Court rejected
109 30 Wis. 2d 228, 234-235, 140 N.W.2d 263, 265-266 (1966).
110 Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 115 N.W.2d 263 (1962).
11138 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
112 Stroup v. Career Academy of Dental Technology-Washington, D.C. Inc.,
38 Wis. 2d 284, 156 N.W.2d 358 (1968).
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essentially this approach in Hanna v. Plumer,113 and held that the
mnanner of service was governed by the Federal Rules, as opposed to
conflicting state law.
Assuming it beyond dispute, however, that federal diversity juris-
diction is at least co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the forum state,
serious policy considerations arise.
(1) Is diversity jurisdiction over non-federal questions really neces-
sary, considering that state jurisdiction of non-residents is potentially
limited only by the boundaries of due process as defined by the Supreme
Court? It could be argued that diversity jurisdiction originally filled a
need (avoiding liability immunity of non-residents) which, by virtue
of the long-arm statutes, no longer exists. The fallacy here, of course,
is that not all states have equally broad long-arm statutes, and thus the
federal court is a necessary balancing system for such differences.
On the other hand, one could contend that the existence of a federal
system and its provision for a judicial branch pre-supposes a determina-
tion by the drafters of the Constitution that it is desirable to have
federal courts generally accessible to residents of all the states. This is
evidenced by inclusion of the crux of diversity jurisdiction in Article
3, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
(2) If diversity jurisdiction is advisable, should it be drastically
limited. The argument is available that no aspect of federalism or the
Constitution requires that federal courts, exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion, decide more than federal questions. Since any court inherently has
the authority to determine its own jurisdiction, subject to legislative
requirements, the Federal Rules could be re-drawn to limit diversity
jurisdiction to matters involving federal law. This would eliminate all
the difficulties raised by Erie and its progeny. Such action would, how-
ever, perhaps encourage the type of forum-shopping among states which
has appeared in Conklin v. Horner.. 4
(3) Since the outer limit of state jurisdiction is in fact a federal
question-i.e. whether due process has been provided-greater certainty
would be available if the limits of jurisdiction were set out in the Federal
Rules. This would not conflict with Erie principles since: (1) it would
discourage forum shopping; (2) Erie can be read as dealing with the
law to be applied once jurisdiction is established, rather than with the
question of jurisdiction itself; (3) jurisdictional definitions are within
the purview of the Federal Rules by virtue of the Enabling Act" 5 and
would control even under Erie, since jurisdiction is a means of enforc-
ing rights and remedies rather than a right or remedy itself.
113380 U.S. 460 (1965).
1"f Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 115 N.W.2d 263 (1962).
15 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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III. ANALOGIES BETWEEN E RIE AND LONG-ARM STATUTES
To some degree, the development of Erie and the development of
long-arm statutes have followed analogous paths. Both concepts in
essence deal with the role of state law in a system of federalism. In an
era of ever-larger and more complex federal government, both doctrines
attempt to delineate areas of state authority within the federal system.
Clearly, both doctrines have vastly expanded the influence of state law
within that system.
The limit on this state influence, it is suggested, is based on the
concept of federalism. If the federal judicial system is to remain in fact
a federal system, at some point it must follow its own law. In cases
where the only basis for jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the logic and constitutional necessity demanding application of
federal rather than state law (or indeed the converse) becomes much
more difficult to discern. However, since by the definition of federalism,
state and federal courts are not identical judicial systems, the point of
division must be determined. Regardless of the language used, this
process of demarcation is simply a policy decision.
The policy currently followed is to limit use of federal law, and,
consequently, expand the use of state law. This policy is evident in both
the exercise of jurisdiction and application of substantive law. Federal
law can be relied on only as to the manner of invoking jurisdiction of,
and administering the process of the litigation in, the federal courts.11
To this end, the Federal Rules will control over conflicting state law
even though this may arguably affect the parties to the litigation in a
different manner than would application of state law. In essence, the
Court is merely defending its power to determine the manner in which
federal courts will be run. Certainty and uniformity in the administration
of the federal judicial system appear to be the not-unnecessary goal.
To some extent, however, both goals may have suffered something
of a set-back when state jurisdictional laws were incorporated by refer-
ence into the Federal Rules. This occurred, apparently, under the aus-
pices of a policy of foregoing greater state-law influence. Relevant
Supreme Court decisions and Advisory Committee Notes117 evidence
great support for expanded state jurisdiction.
As the sovereignty of one state is limited by the sovereignty of all
the others, there must be a limit imposed on the jurisdictional authority
of all. Only the federal court system is capable of imposing this limit
because, again, the very crux of federalism is involved. Federalism, of
course, pre-supposes a conglomerate of states with equal authority and
an overriding system with the power to limit the authority of the several
states. For these reasons, there must be a limit to the power of a state
116 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
117 FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 1967 Cum. Ann. Pocket Pt. p. 73.
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to reach beyond its physical boundaries and subject a person to its au-
thority.
The limit on this power has been defined by "due process," "fun-
damental fairness," and various other phrases, all of which deal with
the same concept. The core of the limitation may rest on the concept of
federalism which makes each state the master of (almost) all it surveys
within its geographical boundries; states may not impose their authority
upon persons and transactions in other states, unless the home state has
a superior interest. State "interest," of course, must be more than aca-
demic; the police power of the state has in almost all instances been
the basis for the exercise of state jurisdiction over non-residents.
However, a nebulous "something more" than police power also
appears to be involved. A state may have a valid interest in certain types
of transactions, generally without having the right to exercise its author-
ity over a particular transaction."':" It is apparently also necessary that
the party, over whom the state seeks to assert its authority, have had
some sort of voluntary self-initiated contact with that state. The degree
of validation necessary is unclear, and may well be restated in the future.
It may be that this "something more" which currently appears to be
firmly required, will drop out of the test. Police power is at least a
better understood concept, which would, perhaps, provide more clearly
defined limits to state jurisdiction. At least greater certainty, if not
greater uniformity, would be likely to result.
Another aspect of the policy problem is that the very long-arm
statutes the court applauds impair uniformity among the federal courts.
The jurisdictional statutes of each state differ. Thus, their incorporation
by reference into the Federal Rules makes non-uniform these very Rules.
Consequently, since Federal Rules will control the conduct of the suit,
but the Rules in fact differ depending upon the state in which the Court
sits, there may be a great revival, among the federal courts, of the
forum-shopping Erie hoped to defeat.
It seems clearly within the power of the federal courts under the
Enabling Act'1 9 to avoid this, by adopting their own jurisdictional
definitions. The question is whether they will do so.
JOAN KESSLER
118 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
-19 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
1968]
